Corrupt contracts are illegal and, therefore, vulnerable to hold-up. That is, a bureaucrat who has accepted a bribe from a …rm in exchange for a license may still choose not to grant the …rm that license (hold-up). This paper studies the role that intermediaries play in facilitating bribery by preventing such hold-up. There are two types of …rms, good …rms that are legally entitled to receive a license, and harmful …rms that are not. In the absence of any intermediaries, because of the hold-up possibilities, only good …rms enter the market, and harmful …rms do not. Intermediaries help …rms reduce their navigation costs of obtaining licenses, and thereby increase participation by good …rms. However, intermediaries can also use the legal aspects of their transaction with good …rms as leverage against the bureaucrat in order to prevent hold-up among harmful …rms. Thus, intermediaries increase participation by both good and harmful …rms and their welfare costs are ambiguous. JEL: D21, K42
Introduction
Foreign Corruption Practices Act of the U.S. acknowledges this by allowing …rms to make "facilitating payments for routine governmental action", including for issuing licenses, "that are already required by law" (O'Melveny 2009). However, intermediaries may also be able to facilitate the bribing of o¢ cials (and prevent hold-up) in order to obtain a business permit even when it is illegal to grant the …rm such a permit. Indeed, as Lambsdor¤ and Teksoz (2005) state, a purely corrupt relationship is a rare thing. Corrupt deals are commonly embedded in more complex relationships between di¤erent actors. More often than not these relationships also entail a variety of legal transactions.
Other empirical studies of bribery also …nd that intermediaries are employed to conduct both legal and illegal services, sometimes for the same client and at other times for di¤erent clients. Bjorvatn, Torsvik, and Tungodden (2005) , in their study of corruption in Tanzania, …nd that former bureaucrats, who were …red during an anti-corruption operation, become intermediaries. These former bureaucrats use their former contacts to foster corrupt transactions. In a recent "audit study" of procuring drivers licenses in New Delhi, India, Bertrand et al. (2007) …nd that applicants often employ the services of intermediaries in order to obtain their license. In this context, intermediaries are employed to speed-up the processing time for a license, and enable their clients to procure a license even without taking the driving test. Although their study does not have any direct evidence of bribery, it suggests that a signi…cant fraction of the fees that clients pay intermediaries is passed on the bureaucrat in the form of a bribe. Furthermore, based on the results of a subsequent driving test, they …nd that both "good" drivers (who should receive a license) and "poor" drivers (who should not), employ intermediaries in order to procure their license. Oldenburg (1987) similarly discusses the role of intermediaries in facilitating bribe payments in a land consolidation program for farmers in India. He …nds that intermediaries are often used to pass on bribes to bureaucrats from their clients. He observes that these bribes are sometimes paid to "speed-up" perfectly legal land consolidation applications, while in other cases intermediaries are employed to facilitate improper or illegal land consolidation requests. Indeed, he states that the "overall transaction is proper even though the sub-transactions are corrupt."
In this paper we argue that the legal-illegal combination of the services that intermediaries provide is a critical element of the mechanism that intermediaries employ to prevent "holdup". We develop a model to show that intermediaries are able to prevent corrupt contracts from being vulnerable to hold-up because they embed corrupt contracts within more complex, partially legal, contracts. Thus, as Lambsdor¤ (2002) notes, many corrupt contracts occur in the "shadow of the law" where "the legal transaction acts as a guarantor of the corrupt deal" (Lambsdor¤, 2005) . Speci…cally, in our model intermediaries legally reduce the navigation costs of seeking permits or licenses for …rms. Hence intermediaries facilitate delivery of permits to …rms that are legally entitled to receive this permit. However, they also attempt to obtain permits for …rms that are not legally entitled to receive such permits. We show that intermediaries can exploit this combination of legitimate and illegitimate services to enforce occasional (i.e. one-shot) bribe contracts even in the presence of hold-up (and without resorting to in…nitely repeated play or reputations).
To understand our intuition more clearly, consider a model with two types of …rms: some that are legally eligible to apply for a license and others that are not. Both types of …rms are subject to navigation costs that can be reduced by hiring the intermediary. A corruptible bureaucrat issues permits buts incurs some positive cost in doing so. The bureaucrat can withhold a permit from an eligible …rm unless it is paid a bribe (extortion) or grant a license to an ineligible …rm in exchange for a bribe (bribery). Both types of …rms are subject to holdup by the bureaucrat. Since we study a single period scenario, reputational concerns or other "repeated game enforcement mechanisms" cannot enforce the bribe contract, therefore, holdup by the bureaucrat is credible. However, the institutional setting allows …rms, whether eligible or ineligible, to appeal (at some cost) to a higher authority (or court) to request a license if their application was previously denied. Because of the existence of the appeals process, eligible …rms are not subject to any hold-up. 1 However, since appeals are costly, these …rms do pay a positive bribe to receive the permit. The ineligible …rm, on the other hand, does not bene…t from the appeals process and, therefore, is likely to be held-up by the bureaucrat after paying any bribe.
The solution to the hold-up problem is based on two key attributes associated with the presence of an intermediary. First, the intermediary enjoys substantial economies of scale in court costs so that once it goes to court, the costs of any future litigations are much lower.
Second, an intermediary can engage in collective bribe negotiation with the bureaucrat so that if the bureaucrat fails to deliver the permit for a single …rm, the intermediary can renegotiate the bribe amount for the remaining client …rms. Speci…cally, suppose an intermediary has both eligible and ineligible …rms as its clients and negotiates a bribe amount with the bureaucrat for a certain number of permits. The intermediary …rst charges each …rm an up-front fee. It then processes the applications of the ineligible …rms followed by the those of the eligible …rms (the latter acting as the carrot). In the event of hold-up (for any ineligible …rm), the intermediary can approach the court in order to prove that it made an honest e¤ort to procure a license on behalf of the …rm, thereby, avoiding any loss of reputation.
This decision to go to court triggers a renegotiation of the bribe which the intermediary has to pay the bureaucrat for the (remaining) eligible …rms. Since the bribe amount depends on the court costs and costs exhibit returns to scale, this renegotiated bribe is lower following any incident of hold-up. 2 Thus, if the expected reduction in the future bribe from the intermediary is greater than its bene…t from hold-up, the bureaucrat will not hold-up the licenses of any ineligible …rms. Further, the intermediary is never held-up for any eligible …rm as it can always approach the court to appeal against the non-issuance of permits.
After studying the conditions under which the above mechanism can prevent hold-up, we also study the welfare implications of intermediaries. We show that in the absence of 1 Our use of the term "hold-up" should be distinguished from Lambert -Mogiliansky, Majumder, and Radner (2007) and Choi and Thum (2004) . These papers refer to "hold-up" as the practice (by bureaucrats)
of denying licenses to …rms that are legally entitled to receive those licenses unless they are paid a bribe. In contrast, we identify this behavior as extortion and refer to hold-up as the practice of denying …rms licenses to …rms after they have paid a bribe, and irrespective of whether they are legally entitled to receive the license or not.
2 Note that the intermediary will approach the court irrespective of whether the denied …rm is eligible or ineligible. Failure to do so damages its reputation. We can relax this assumption and generate committment through contractual means, as done in an earlier version. We thank a referee for the current interpretation.
intermediaries only a subset of legally eligible …rms receive licenses, and that hold-up prevents ineligible …rms from entering the market. In the presence of intermediaries the navigation costs for …rms are lowered. As a result, more eligible …rms enter the market. However, since intermediaries also provide services to illegal …rms and enable them to "solve" the hold-up problem, the number of illegal …rms also increases in the presence of intermediaries. Hence, the number of …rms of both types increases in the presence of intermediaries, and to the extent the presence of ineligible …rms is welfare reducing, there is a trade-o¤ to eliminating intermediaries altogether.
Although, to our knowledge, ours is the …rst model to consider this mechanism using legal-illegal interface, there is a sizeable literature on the type of bureaucratic corruption that is studied in this paper. 3 The majority of these papers study the policy implications of bribery and do not explicitly model the transaction process of bribe contracts or the means by which they are enforced. More recent papers attempt to bridge this gap in the literature by studying the role of intermediaries. Bayar (2005) , and similarly Bose and Gangopadhyay (2009), examine the role of intermediaries in a model where some bureaucrats are corrupt and others honest and where the identity of these corrupt bureaucrats is known only to the intermediary (and not the …rm). Firms that approach corrupt bureaucrats directly may illegally receive a permit in exchange for a bribe, whereas …rms that approach honest bureaucrats are punished for attempted bribery. Thus, because of their knowledge regarding the identity of bureaucrats, intermediaries lower the cost of bribery and are able to facilitate corrupt transactions even in situations where most bureaucrats are honest. Although their paper focuses on the "informational" role of intermediaries it does not examine the role that intermediaries may play in preventing "hold-up". Hasker and Okten (2008) Our paper is related to these papers in that we study bribery in the presence of hold-up without relying on repeated play to enforce the bribe contract. However, instead of studying hostage mechanisms we show that bribery can be sustained when the intermediary provides both legitimate and illegitimate services to …rms. In contrast to our paper, Buccirossi and Spagnolo (2006) assume that only …rms that are not eligible for a permit pay a bribe. In our model both eligible and ineligible …rms have to pay bribes to obtain a license. Thus, bribery is not necessarily welfare reducing because it may increase the number of eligible …rms.
Following the introduction, the second section presents the benchmark model and derives the equilibrium without intermediaries, the third extends the benchmark model to include 5 Bureaucrats are corruptible and attempt to extort payments from g types and bribes from h types. Distinguishing between these two forms of bribery is important because licenses should be issued to all g types and to none of the h types. 6 Turning now to the institutional framework, there is a court (or some higher authority) that can be used to appeal the bureaucrat's decision. Speci…cally, if a …rm's license application is rejected by a bureaucrat, the …rm (or an intermediary acting on behalf of the …rm) may decide to appeal to this court at a cost . We assume that is non-monetary, therefore, the court cannot reimburse the …rm for these expenses. If a g type appeals then the court ensures that the bureaucrat exerts e¤ort e to grant the …rm the license, whereas a h type is never granted a license even if it appeals to a court. In addition, whenever the bureaucrat has received a bribe from a good …rm, the court …nds enough evidence to impose 5 It is possible to have a case where the bureaucrat knows the type but not the actual v of the …rm. The key result of the paper does not change, though the bribe determination process and some of the comparative statics do change. 6 The bureaucrat colludes with the h-type to issue a license in exchange for a bribe. 
Game ends
Court a, possibly small, but positive penalty f: 7 Implicit in this framework is the assumption that a g type …rm that appeals to the court (after having paid a bribe) is granted immunity from any penalties for bribery. However, full immunity is not necessary for our results, and this assumption can be relaxed.
Corruption in the absence of intermediaries
As a benchmark, consider a model without an intermediary. The extensive form of this game is given in Figure 1 .
First, consider the bribe negotiation between the …rm and the bureaucrat, which we model as a Nash bargaining game. If an agreement is reached during the Nash bargaining stage, the bureaucrat receives the bribe in exchange for agreeing to exert e¤ort (e) to process the license. Thus, the Nash bargaining bribe is paid with the quid pro quo agreement that the …rm will be granted the license at some future stage. However, this Nash bargaining solution cannot be enforced and a bureaucrat may hold-up the …rm by not granting the …rm 7 Note that there is no …ne if the bureaucrat has not issued the license but has not taken any bribe. This is perhaps more realistic than the case where the court always …nes the bureaucrat. Given that there are di¤erent types of …rms, it is possible for the bureaucrat to mistake a g type as a h type and deny a license.
the license despite having accepted the bribe. 8 Within the framework speci…ed above, if a bureaucrat holds up a …rm, a g type …rm will always choose to go to court. Since going to court results in a …ne f; a bureaucrat will never hold-up a g type …rm. However, h type …rms will never choose to go to court because appealing to the court does not produce a license. Thus, h type …rms will always be held-up.
Let x denote the bribe paid by a g type in exchange for license. Then the agreement and disagreement payo¤s are
Given the above payo¤s the Nash bargaining solution (assuming equal bargaining powers)
x will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product.
x = arg max
Thus, conditional on choosing to apply for a license, a g type …rm will pay a bribe x = 2 :
Since h type …rms are always held-up, they will never pay a bribe in equilibrium, b = 0:
9
Given this bribe game, we now turn to the entrepreneur's decision to apply for a license (and enter the market). Note that a g type …rm can credibly threaten to take the bureaucrat to court only if v > : Further, the cost to a g type …rm that chooses to apply for a license is + =2; therefore, a g type …rm with v > will choose to apply for a license only if
Under the assumption of sequential rationality, we solve for the sub-game perfect Nash equilibrium of the above game using backward induction. It is clear that, for any g type with v maxf ; + =2g making the extortion payment (x = 2 ), going to court if held-up, and the bureaucrat granting the license constitute an equilibrium. Further, it can be veri…ed that this equilibrium satis…es backward induction.
We now turn to …rms with v < : In this case, a …rm will never approach the court and 8 The bureaucrat saves e > 0 by holding up. There can be several other reasons why hold-up might be pro…table but we do not consider these and focus more on the implications of such hold-ups. 9 It should be noted that, if bribing were enforceable then the Nash bargaining solution between a bureaucrat an h type will yield a bribe of
consequently will always be held up by the bureaucrat. Irrespective of the outcome of Nash bargaining, the bureaucrat has no incentive to incur positive cost and issue the license. Since v is observable to the bureaucrat, any …rm with v < will not apply. We characterize this simple equilibrium in the following lemma.
Lemma 1 A g type …rm applies for a license if and only if v maxf ; + =2g and h type …rms do not enter the market due to hold up.
Remark 2 If the navigation costs are small relative to the litigation costs (i.e. < =2);
then the entry decision to apply for a license is only a¤ected by the litigation costs ; and reducing the navigation cost will not change the number of …rms.
Navigation costs in our model may be interpreted as red tape, and it is often suggested that lowering red tape can reduce bribery and increase e¢ ciency. Remark 2, however, suggests an interesting …nding regarding the e¤ectiveness of this policy. If the navigation costs are low relative to litigation costs , then lowering these navigation costs will not increase e¢ ciency by increasing the number of good …rms that enter the market.
Corruption with monopolistic intermediaries
We now consider the role of a monopolistic intermediary (M ) who can reduce the navigation cost . Due to its familiarity with the system, the intermediary's cost of navigating the bureaucracy to obtain a license is 0: A …rm of type i = fg; hg and an intermediary sign a contract where the …rm pays m i to the intermediary in order to navigate the application process (i.e. lower navigation costs to = 0) and procure the license. This re ‡ects Bray's (2005) assertion that,
[b]y employing a local agent or a representative, companies can cut down the time needed to get to know new markets and thus reduce the costs of operating there. Intermediaries may also act as a bu¤er against demands for bribes: they can make their decisions whether or not to pay, according to local custom.
We denote the actual number of applicant …rms of type i by k i ; where k i n i : If the intermediary succeeds in obtaining the license the game ends. However, if the bureaucrat holds-up the intermediary and does not grant the license, the intermediary incurs a reputation cost of D > 0 unless the intermediary appeals to the court at cost T . These reputation costs may re ‡ect lost business from future referrals from this …rm. The cost is avoided if the intermediary goes to court perhaps because it will be perceived as having made an honest e¤ort to procure the license if it goes to court. 10 Thus, there two aspects to appeals. The …rst occurs when an appeal is made by the intermediary (against the bureaucrat) for not issuing a license. In this case, the court examines the appeal and bureaucrat is required to grant licenses to the g type …rms, while h type …rms are not granted the license. The second aspect to the appeal arises when, irrespective of the type of …rm, an intermediary approaches the court to avoid incurring costs D: Note that because the intermediary provides both types of …rms with a legitimate service (reducing navigation costs), the court cannot penalize it for contracting with the h types: 11 The intermediary's court costs take a speci…c form in that it depends on the number of its client …rms. Speci…cally, there is a …xed cost F that is incurred only once, and a variable cost Z for each appeal that the intermediary chooses to make. That is, suppose the intermediary has not gone to court for any of the 1; 2; :::n 1 license applications, then the total cost of going to court for the n th …rm is T = F + Z: On the other hand if the intermediary went to court for any of the n = < n applications, then the cost of going to court for each n > n = is T = Z:Obviously, these costs are related to the …rm's litigation costs : It is reasonable to assume that F + Z > > Z:
The logic behind this cost function is similar to that found in Gintis'(2009) analysis of a …rm's choice between hiring a lawyer only if it is accused of wrongdoing, and keeping a lawyer on "retainer" permanently. By maintaining a lawyer on retainer a …rm incurs only the marginal cost and not the …xed cost for its legal defense, whereas by hiring a lawyer only after it has been accused it must incur both the …xed and the marginal cost of legal fees. In our model, the intermediary's …xed cost may be interpreted as the costs of hiring a lawyer on retainer. Once these costs have been sunk, it incurs only the marginal cost for 10 Alternatively, the intermediary and …rm may include a damage clause in their contract. The clause may state that: "the intermediary shall pay the …rm D in the event it fails to make su¢ cient e¤ort in procuring the license." 11 It may appear inconsistent that the intermediary is not penalized by the court for attempting to obtain a license for the h types. However, we assume that the intermediary's knowledge of the …rm's type is soft
(not third-party veri…able), therefore, it cannot be responsible for agreeing to lower the navigation costs of either type of …rm. 
A market with g types
To understand how the presence of the intermediary a¤ects the market, we begin by studying the equilibrium with only g types. In contrast to the game without an intermediary where each …rm negotiates independently with the bureaucrat, here the intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate over an aggregate bribe B g that is paid in exchange for the licenses of all the …rms that the intermediary represents. We assume that this bribe is determined through Nash bargaining between the intermediary and the bureaucrat. The time-line of the game is outlined below and characterized in the extensive form game (see Figure 2 ).
1. In period 0 …rms realize their value for the licence v: The intermediary chooses fees
2. Given their valuation v and the fees m g , k g number of g type …rms sign a contract with the intermediary to help lower negotiation costs and deliver the licenses. 12 A similar cost structure is also found in Konrad and Skaaperdas (1997) 3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate (through Nash bargaining) over an aggregate bribe B g in exchange for k g number of licenses to be granted. In the absence of any agreement, the bureaucrat chooses whether to issue any license. If any of the k g licenses are not issued, the intermediary can appeal the bureaucrat's decision in court, where the cost of going to court is T (described above). Since the …rm is a g type, the court instructs the bureaucrat to issue the license.
4. In the event of an agreement, bribe B g is paid and the k g licenses are granted if the bureaucrat chooses not to hold-up the intermediary. If the bureaucrat holds-up and issues l < k g licenses, the intermediary must decide whether to go to court or not. If the intermediary chooses not go to court, it will incur a cost of D from k g l …rms for
failing to procure the licenses on their behalf: If the intermediary appeals to the court, the bureaucrat is forced to process the licenses and is penalized f for having accepted a bribe. Conditional on going to court, the intermediary always avoids incurring the reputation costs of D(k g l).
13
It is clear that in any equilibrium (satisfying subgame perfection) the bureaucrat never holds up the intermediary and will always deliver the license (l = k g ) if it expects the intermediary to approach the court. Thus, assuming that D su¢ ciently large, which we specify more precisely below, the intermediary will always approach the court if a license is not delivered. Thus, there is no hold-up in this equilibrium with g types:
Turning to the Nash bargaining game, the disagreement payo¤s O B ; O M for the bureaucrat and the intermediary are given by
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for k g …rms resulting in the payo¤ (F + k g Z): The bureaucrat's disagreement payo¤ re ‡ects the fact that it will be asked to issue k g licenses. Assuming that the intermediary seeks licenses for 13 This cost captures lost business from other potential clients due to negative "referrals" from these …rms.
Thus, the reputation cost here is di¤erent from the standard de…nition of "reputation" within the context of repeated games (as discussed in Mailath and Samuelson 2006). k g …rms, the bribe B g will be given by the solution to the following maximization of the Nash product.
Comparing this case with the model without intermediaries (eq 1), it is easy to see that the presence of an intermediary a¤ects the …rm's costs in two ways. First, as discussed earlier it reduces the navigation cost from to 0: Second, if > Z + F=k g ; each …rm's extortion payment (now paid through the intermediary) is also reduced. Thus, assuming that the intermediary does not expropriate the entire surplus, a …rm's payo¤ will be higher in the presence of an intermediary.
14 From the preceding discussion, it is clear that the bene…t to the …rm from intermediation depends on the total surplus generated by the intermediary and the exact division of this surplus. 15 As noted, this surplus depends on the size of the navigation cost and the di¤erence in legal costs (F + Z (Z + F=k g ) > 0); which depends on the number of …rms (k g ). The number of …rms, in turn, depends on the fees that the intermediary charges. Since we assume that the intermediary is a pro…t maximizing monopolist, it chooses a fee that maximizes its pro…ts, given the above bribe. Firms take the fee as given and make their entry decisions accordingly. su¢ cient number of potential …rms (that is, there exists n g such that if n g n g ) interme- 14 Note that even if the extortion payment is not reduced, the …rm may still use an intermediariy because the reduced navigation costs may o¤set a potentially higher extortion payment. Speci…cally, if Z +F=k g 2 the …rm will prefer to have a middlemen.
diation is pro…table and the intermediary will set its fees,
In this case the number of g type …rms entering the market will not be lower compared to the case without intermediation.
Proof. Assumption 1 requires that the following incentive compatibility constraint be satis…ed,
Hence to set the fees, the intermediary solves the following maximization problem.
Using Assumption 2 we note that the expected number of …rms that will enter the market for a given m is,
Combining the previous two equations, the intermediary's pro…t function is,
It can be shown that the solution to the …rst order condition is,
Note that the intermediary's pro…t is strictly increasing in m at m = 0: Thus, either the We now show that under Assumptions 1 -2, there always exists an n g such that for all n g n g the intermediary can make a positive pro…t. First, consider the case where ; or that the …rst term in the intermediaries pro…t function (6) is strictly positive. Thus, if > + 2 ; so that the intermediary charges m g = + 2 : In this case, it is easy to see that the …rst term in the intermediary's pro…t (6) is strictly positive. Following similar arguments, it can be shown that there exists an n g such that for all n g n g the intermediary can make a positive pro…t.
To show that the number of …rms will not be lower, recognize that the intermediary chooses m such that + 2 m: Thus, at least as many (or more …rms) will enter the market with an intermediary than without.
Market with g types and h types
We now turn to a market with both g types and h types: Recall that in the absence of intermediaries only the g types apply for a license, while the h types abstain from entering the market because of hold-up. We now show that in the presence of an intermediary h types may be able to avoid the hold-up problem and enter the market. Consider the following time line that informally characterizes the extensive form game with both types.
The corresponding extensive form of this game is found in …gure 3. 3. The intermediary and the bureaucrat negotiate over the total bribe B and the total number of licenses k = k h + k g to be awarded. They also agree whether to implement the agreed contract in a single stage or in a phased manner. In a single stage contract the bribe B is made in one payment, where as in a phased contract part of the bribe B h is paid for the k h licenses of the h types, and another bribe amount is paid later for the delivery of the licenses for the g types. If there is no agreement, the intermediary chooses whether to make any license application on behalf of the …rms and whether to approach the court. Having solved the game with only g types in the previous section, we focus our analysis on the h types: Recall that for the h types; the intermediary cannot force the bureaucrat to grant it the licenses, but it can approach the court to avoid having to incur costs D: As in the case with g types only, we …rst study the negotiation between the bureaucrat and the intermediary using the concept of Nash Bargaining solution.
Let k h ; k g be the number of h types and g types who have paid the required fees (m h ; m g ) to engage the services of the intermediary. If the bureaucrat and the intermediary fail to agree, the disagreement payo¤s will be given by
In the disagreement game, the intermediary approaches the court to seek licenses for k g …rms resulting in the payo¤ (F + k g Z): For the h types, it will approach the court to avoid the reputational costs D, leading to a payo¤ of k h Z: The bureaucrat's disagreement payo¤ re ‡ects the fact that it will be asked to issue k g licenses. Assuming that M seeks licenses for k …rms, the bribe B will be given by the solution to the maximization of the Nash product,
Proposition 4 Suppose F > 2e, n g su¢ ciently large, and Assumptions 1-2 are satis…ed.
There exists a two-phased contract where the intermediary pays B h to receive k h licenses for the h types, followed by B g to receive k g licenses. In this case both types of …rms enter the market, and hold-up does not occur. The intermediary charges di¤erent fees to the two types:
Proof. The details for this proof are provided in the Appendix, however, we provide the basic intuition below. First, the intermediary pays a certain portion of the total bribe (B)
and receives a (mutuall agreeable) corresponding number of licenses. Once these licenses are delivered, the intermediary pays the rest of the bribe to receive the other licenses. Since for the g types, hold-up is not an issue (as seen in the previous section), it is natural that the intermediary would like to get licenses for the h types …rst. If the bureaucrat holds up any h-type's license, the intermediary goes to the court to avoid D and renegotiates the extortion payment for the g types. Since renegotiated bribe goes down by F=2; the bureaucrat will not hold-up as long as the gains from holding up (e) are small compared to F=2. It is important that at least one g types follows the h types, otherwise the intermediary will be left with no leverage.
17 17 Although we focus only on a two stage bribe, several multi-stage contracts are feasible. Indeed, the aggregate bribe B (as in 11) can be partitioned into several payments made at each stage. However, regardless of the number of stages, the total bribe (in the absence of hold-up) must be equal to B: If hold-up were to occur at some stage, the renegotiated bribe will always be always be reduced by F=2; regardless of the number of stages.
The determination of fees is identical to the previous case of only g types: The intermediary can treat this as two separate problems subject to the constraint that k g > 1:
For large values of n g , it is clear that
: Similar calculations for the h types (see appendix)
shows that
: The condition F > 2e guarantees that the number of h types seeking license will be positive.
Similar to the analysis in Section 3.1, we study the intermediary's pro…t function. First, note that we must have v > m h ;otherwise none of the h types would apply for a license.
Thus, it can be shown that the intermediary's pro…t is,
which is strictly positive only if,
We study inequality (13) to understand the implications of the previous proposition.
Observe that (13) is weaker than the pro…tability condition (8) for n g derived in proposition 3; that is, n g < n g : When n g n g the intermediary receives the same pro…ts from g types because m g is the same regardless of whether both types of …rms are present or absent, and a strictly positive pro…t from h types: When n g 2 ( n g ; n g ); then the intermediary is able to receive a positive pro…t from g types, when previously it would not have o¤ered its services to good …rms. Thus, in this case it receives positive pro…ts from g types, in addition to the pro…t it receives from h types. Consequently, its pro…ts are always strictly higher in the presence of both types of …rms, which implies that whenever the potential number of good …rms (n g ) is su¢ ciently large (> n g ), it will also want to o¤er its services to h types. Second, this result implies that are values of n g 2 ( n g ; n g ); where intermediaries would be absent in the presence of only g type …rms, but where they are present if there are both g and h type …rms. Thus, interestingly, when n g 2 ( n g ; n g ); the presence of h types increases the number of g types that enter the market. The following corollary summarizes these results.
Corollary 5
The presence of h type …rms increases the range over which intermediaries are willing to provide services for g type …rms. Further, the intermediary's pro…t is always higher from serving both types of …rms.
Intuitively, in the absence of h types the intermediary o¤ers its services to g types only when there are su¢ ciently many potential g types (i.e. n g su¢ ciently large) so that pro…ts are positive. However, when both types of …rms are present, the intermediary cross-subsidizes the pro…ts obtained from providing its services to h types; in order to provide its services to g types even when there are relatively few g types present. Indeed, it is worth noting that n g is decreasing in n h : Thus, an increase in the number of h type …rms will reduce the minimum number of g types needed for the intermediary to be pro…table.
Proposition 4 and Corollary 5 suggest that the intermediary will o¤er its services to both types (and prevent hold-up among h types) when there are su¢ ciently many g types, when navigation costs are high, and when bureaucratic e¤ort is low relative to the …xed cost of going to court (F > 2e). In general, we should expect that there will be su¢ ciently many g types, otherwise, the regulator could simply prohibit this industry entirely (instead of regulating it by granting only licenses to g types). Thus, we expect the condition that there are su¢ ciently many g types to hold in most cases. Furthermore, it is not surprising that the existence of high navigation costs will encourage the entry of intermediaries. What is more interesting here is that bribery is more likely to occur when the cost of bureaucrat e¤ort is low. This suggests that when the bureaucrat's tasks are relatively easy to perform but court costs are high, then intermediaries will be able to prevent hold-up and enable h types to enter the market.
These results appear to be consistent with the empirical …ndings of Bertrand et. al.'s (2007) study of drivers licenses in India. They …nd that intermediaries help quali…ed (g type) drivers and unquali…ed drivers (h type) drivers navigate the application process and receive licenses. It is likely the case that there are probably a large number of individuals who need licenses, thus, n g and n h are likely to be large. 18 Further, bureaucratic tasks in providing licenses appear to be relatively easy. However, the navigation costs were estimated by individuals to be quite large since on average individuals estimated that they would need to make 6 visits and interact with multiple bureaucrats in order to receive a licenses. Our model suggests that in precisely these situations, intermediaries that serve both types are likely thrive.
Lambsdor¤ (2011), discussing the …ndings of Bray (2005) , points out that intermediaries are used for bribery most frequently in the retail sector and less frequently in oil, gas, and mining. Presumably, the retail sector has a large number of …rms, and further bureaucratic e¤ort is likely to be small. In this context, our model predicts that we should expect to see 18 A similar pattern is observed in the developmental sector where middlemen operate to help both quali…ed as well non-quali…ed bene…ciaries of government's development schemes.
intermediaries utilized to pay bribes more frequently in the retail sector.
From a policy stand point the previous proposition suggests that while lowering court costs (F ) may help prevent bribery, making bureaucratic costs easier (lowering e) may not.
Further, the key …nding of Proposition 4 is that intermediaries provide services to both good and bad …rms and that the good and bad …rms have a symbiotic relationship with each other. Thus, as Bertrand et. al. (2007) point out, bribery not only greases the wheels for the good types, but it also generates costs to society by allowing harmful agents to obtain licenses. Consequently, the overall welfare e¤ect depends on whether their positive impact on good …rms o¤sets their negative impact from introducing harmful …rms. We study these issues in the following section.
Welfare
In the absence of intermediaries, hold-up is a "blessing-in-disguise" because it prevents corruption and entry of the h type …rms. 19 The previous sections have shown how intermediation can, under certain conditions, solve the hold-up problem and encourage corruption. In this section we study the welfare implications of intermediaries.
Assume that v > e and that the harm h from the h types is greater than v: These two conditions ensure that in the …rst best world the regulator will want to grant licenses to all g types and to none of the h types:Furthermore, with only g types, the number of …rms entering the market will always be greater with an intermediary than without. Thus, presence of intermediaries is always welfare enhancing with only g types (see Proposition 3). 20 The more interesting case is when there are both g and h types: Since the presence of h types increase the range over which intermediaries provide services for g types, it suggests that the welfare gain from g types will be realized for even smaller values of n g : However,
since the intermediary facilitates the entry of h types, the overall welfare implications of intermediaries will be ambiguous when there are both types of …rms.
Formally, with both types of …rms, the social welfare (SW) in the presence of an inter-mediary is given by
Under Assumptions 1 -2, this above expression simpli…es to
Since h > v > m h > m g ; the above expression may be positive or negative.
In the absence of an intermediary, the social welfare is
Combining these expressions, it follows that if
then intermediaries will be welfare enhancing.
Note that when the solution to m g is interior, then the left hand side of (16) is strictly positive. Thus, the previous inequality will hold for some parameter values and eliminating intermediaries may result in welfare losses to society. 21 Hence, in this case it will not be optimal to eliminate intermediaries, even though this reduces corruption.
It must be noted that when v is large,
will be large and the incentive compatibility constraint is binding (so that m g = + 2 ). In this case, the bene…t to the g types vanishes or becomes negligible. But we must be careful about doing such comparative statics because without any g types the equilibrium with both types may not exist. Second, as v increases it will most likely be greater than the harm h; violating our condition that for all h types v < h.
We now study the comparative statics of 16. 21 In the case of the following example, welfare is improved with an intermediary. v = 3; v = 1; Z = :5; e = :2; = 2; = 1; h = 3; F = 4; n g = n h = 5: The net gain in social welfare with an intermediary is, 1:85, the intermediary's pro…t is 7:11, the expected number of g types who enter the market 3:4, and h types 2:2: All other constraints can also be shown to be satis…ed.
Proposition 6
Suppose that the number of good …rms is large. There exists a 0; such that for all > ; the presence of an intermediary improves welfare. Furthermore, the (welfare) gains from an intermediary are increasing in e, ; and :
Proof. We need n g to be large so that (16) is satis…ed. The left hand side of (16) is increasing in : Thus, for some su¢ ciently large the presence of an intermediary will raise welfare (relative to the case without an intermediary). Substituting the (interior solutions)
for m h and m g ; into this expression and taking the derivative yields the above results.
This proposition suggests that the welfare from allowing intermediaries to function is larger when the navigation costs are large because intermediaries eliminate these navigation costs. Interestingly, this is despite the fact that intermediaries lower the navigation costs for both good and harmful types. Further, the welfare gain from an intermediary is increasing in the individual …rm's court costs ( ) because …rms are able to "outsource" their legal expenses
to an intermediary and exploit the intermediary's economies of scale. Taken together, this suggests that governments may want to permit intermediaries in situations where navigation costs and court costs are large, but prohibit or limit them when these conditions do not hold Oldenburg (1987) describes the role of intermediaries in facilitating bribe payments for a land grant and consolidation program in India. Since the majority of farmers were eligible for this program, presumably n g was relatively large. However, he notes that the government took much care in minimizing the red-tape or navigation costs for farmers applying for this program. Thus, consistent with Oldenburg's intuition, our model suggests that in this case intermediaries would not be welfare improving. Finally, observe that an increase in e (the bureaucrat's cost of e¤ort) also raises the welfare gains from an intermediary. This occurs because an increase in e increases the fee that the intermediary charges the h types but does not a¤ect the fee that it charges the g types: Thus, an increase in e reduces the participation of h types while not a¤ecting the participation of g types; therefore, a higher e increases the welfare gains from an intermediary.
Conclusion
Intermediaries are frequently employed by …rms in order to facilitate corrupt transactions. . 23 Thus, given this high frequency, many governments are considering whether to prohibit intermediaries entirely.
In light of the relevance of this issue, this paper studies the role of intermediaries in facilitating corrupt transactions. Although the previous literature has studied the role of intermediaries in enabling corruption, none of these papers have examined the mechanism through which intermediaries prevent hold-up. Our analysis of intermediation and hold-up highlights the mixture of both legal and illegal services that the intermediary o¤ers, and
shows that it may be di¢ cult to separate these two aspects.
Speci…cally, we show that in the absence of intermediaries only good …rms enter the market, and harmful …rms are dissuaded from entering the market because bureaucrats can hold-up their license applications. In the presence of intermediaries who lower navigation costs, the number of good …rms increase. Thus, if only good …rms are present, and the potential number of good …rms is su¢ ciently large so that intermediaries can pro…t from them, then intermediaries unambiguously improve social welfare. 23 All details are available from: http://www.justice.gov/criminal/fraud/fcpa/cases/a.html When both good and bad …rms are present, we show that intermediaries can employ the legal elements of their business (i.e. services to good …rms) in order to prevent hold-up from occurring to harmful …rms. Intermediaries always receive a higher pro…t from serving both types of …rms and, therefore, procure licenses for both good and harmful …rms. Thus, the possibility of hold-up no longer prevents harmful …rms from entering the market. Hence, the legal arm of the middleman is pre-requisite for the illegal arm to function. Interestingly however, because intermediaries pro…t from both types of …rms, the existence of harmful …rms has a positive impact on the participation of good …rms by making intermediation on behalf of good …rms viable for a larger range of parameter values. Thus, in contrast to models of adverse selection where the bad drives out the good, in our model good and bad …rms complement each other through an intermediary. Speci…cally, the presence of harmful …rms raises the pro…tability of intermediation and makes it viable, enabling more good …rms to enter the market, and good …rms in turn make it possible for harmful …rms to avoid hold-up, thereby encouraging more harmful …rms to enter the market.
With regard to the welfare e¤ects, we …nd that since more good and harmful types enter the market in the presence of an intermediary, the welfare costs of intermediaries are ambiguous in general. Speci…cally, we show that as long as the navigation costs are su¢ ciently large, and there are su¢ ciently many g types, intermediaries will enhance welfare because the gains to the good …rms can o¤set the costs from the harmful …rms. Thus eliminating intermediaries may not be bene…cial. This …nding resonates with Lambsdor¤ (2011) who argues that in most cases prohibiting intermediaries is not good policy because, "complete prohibition of intermediaries hinders …rms from reaping the gains that intermediaries might contribute. For example, if honest …rms and "good" intermediaries are impeded by prohibition, public procurement may su¤er from reduced competition, which is likely to reduce welfare."
Although our model considers a market with many …rms, it can be interpreted more broadly as a single …rm with several license applications, some of which are legal and others illegal. For example, a real estate developer may apply for several building permits, some of which may be legal, while others illegal. Our model shows that these legal services can be used as leverage against the bureaucrat in order to prevent hold-up among the illegal applications. In fact, our analysis can be applied in several other contexts such as the delivery of developmental goods and services, and the implementation of public programmes. In all these contexts, intermediaries serve both as informational navigator and bribe facilitator.
Our analysis shows that eliminating intermediaries is not the most e¢ cient way to reduce corruption.
We conclude by discussing a few implications and extensions to our model. First, in our model context, average bribe paid through an intermediary will be higher than those paid without an intermediary. This result arises directly from the fact that intermediaries pay bribes on behalf of both g and h types. Since h types have to pay higher bribes, the average bribe paid through an intermediary may be higher. Interestingly, data collected by the authors on violations of the FCPA support this …nding. Speci…cally, we …nd that the average bribe paid with an intermediary is 2,749,500 (USD) for U.S. companies and 582,314 (EU) for European cases, while the average in the absence of an intermediary is $351,185(USD) and 173,583 (EU) respectively. 24 Second, our model suggests that intermediaries and bureaucrats will often make multiple bribe payments in order to avoid hold-up. Interestingly, in several of these FCPA cases the bribes are paid in more than one installment.
Third, our paper implicitly assumed that intermediaries are granted leniency from bribe giving. This is consistent with recent literature suggesting that legalizing bribe giving (for some types of bribes) can reduce corruption (Basu 2011 ). However, this literature has not examined whether such policies should be extended to intermediaries who pay bribes on behalf of …rms. It is straight forward to extend our model include a penalty for bribe giving (for the intermediary). Suppose that there are only g types so that all bribes are extortionary (or harassment bribes), which is consistent with Basu (2011) and Spagnolo (2004) . Further, assume that intermediaries are not granted leniency, but are …ned f M > 0 when they go to court to appeal the bureaucrat's decision to not grant them the license. It can be shown that if the reputation costs are su¢ ciently large D, then there all of the results of this paper remain. However, if D is small (below F + kZ + f M ), intermediaries will no longer want to pay a bribe (because the bureaucrat will hold-up the license since the intermediary can no longer credibly commit to go to court). In this case, …rms will hire intermediaries only in order to reduce their navigation costs. However, the fees charged by intermediaries will be higher than when f M = 0; therefore, fewer g types may enter the market and welfare will be lower without the leniency policy. Hence, extending leniency policies to intermediaries will 24 However, it should be noted that these descriptive statics are unconditional means. An alternative explanation may be that …rms with high-value contracts use intermediaries, while those with low-value contracts bribe directly. While this is certaintly plausible, it should be noted that most of the instances of corruption in our sample involve large …rms with very high value contracts. Nevertheless, given that we do not present regression results that condition on contract value, we cannot rule out this possibility.
never lower welfare.
Fourth, the welfare analysis of the presence of the intermediary is robust to the consideration of alternative information structures and bribe determination process. For example, the bureaucrat may not have full knowledge of v, but may only know the type of the …rm.
In this case, the bureaucrat determines the amount of extortion payment from the g types as a monopolistic …rm, to maximize total pro…t. In such a scenario, the bribe demand x from the g type …rms, in the absence of intermediaries, is x = Proof. We prove the result in three steps.
(1) First, we show that there exists a phased contract where the intermediary …rst pays B h for k h licenses for the h types, followed by B g for k g licenses, where B h = (k h Z + k h e)=2
and B g = (F + k g Z)=2:
Suppose the bureaucrat holds up the intermediary and issues l < k h licenses in the …rst phase. This will cost the intermediary a total of (k h l)D in reputation costs. Even if there is only one h type; as long as D > Z + In the second stage, upon payment of B r g the bureaucrat will issue k g licenses. Hold-up is not pro…table at this stage because the intermediary can always go to court to seek licenses for the g types. Further, since a bribe has been exchanged, the bureaucrat will incur a penalty f > 0: Hence, hold-up is never optimal. Since the bureaucrat does not hold-up in the second stage, its expected payo¤ from holding up in the …rst stage decreases by F=2; but its bene…t from holding up is (k h l)e: Since bene…ts from holding up is maximized for l = 0; hold up will not occur in the …rst stage if F=2 k h e; or 2k h e F:
(2) Hold-up will not be pro…table as long as k g 1: Recall that the equilibrium number of …rms of each type depend on n i and the fee m i : The fees charged must be large enough to cover the intermediary's bribe payment B, which is additively separable in k g and k h : Thus, the fraction of the bribe B ( see 11) that is allocated in the …rst stage towards procuring the licenses for the h types will not a¤ect the intermediary's pro…t maximizing choice of m g ; and in turn the number of g types that apply for a licenses (k g ). Hence, the middleman's pro…t from the h types will not depend on the number of g types (and vice-versa) and m g will be determined exactly as in proposition 3. It can be shown that m g = minf 
:
Next, we determine the fees that will be charged by the intermediary for the h types:
The middleman will choose m h to solve the following maximization problem.
M ax k h (m h ) m h k h (m h )(Z + e) 2 ; subject to k h (m h ) F 2e :
Note that the constraint is the "no hold-up" constraint that ensures that the bureaucrat does not hold-up. A straightforward calculation shows that,
Substituting this into the constraint implies that,
Condition F > 2e is clearly necessary to ensure that there are some h types in the market.
